Sheldon Halpern and the Right of Publicity by Leaffer, Marshall
Sheldon Halpern and the Right of Publicity
MARSHALL LEAFFER
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................273 
II. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY REVISITED ..................................................274 
III. SHELDON HALPERN AND ASSOCIATIVE VALUE OF 
PERSONALITY ..............................................................................275 
IV. CONCLUSION................................................................................277 
I. INTRODUCTION
I met Sheldon Halpern several decades ago when he decided to leave 
corporate practice and become a full-time teacher. I was immediately 
impressed by the warmth of his personality and his intense interest in 
intellectual property law. From that time on, we never lost contact. Halpern
was one of those people who “knew no strangers” and was blessed with so 
many friendships both in the United States and abroad. I immediately knew he 
would be a credit to our teaching profession, and my guess was right on.
Halpern had a distinguished career as a teacher and a scholar. He organized 
several outstanding conferences, which he orchestrated with panache—
Halpern at his generous, outgoing best.
Although we never served on the same faculty, we kept in touch regularly 
and we always picked up where we left off. He was family. I used to kid him 
by saying that he reminded me of my Uncle Manny from the Bronx. We 
always had things to talk about, whether we were discussing law or life or 
anything else. We sometimes disagreed on some legal issues, but it was always 
fun to see Halpern trying to set you straight. One issue of continuous debate 
was about the right of publicity, a subject on which Halpern was a recognized 
expert. So, in this remembrance of my dear friend, I would like to single out 
one of Halpern’s contributions to the literature, his justification of the right of 
publicity, which he called the “associative value of personality.”1
Halpern’s espousal of the right of publicity differed from his colleagues in 
the field who have largely disdained this newest right in the domain of 
                                                                                                                     
Professor of Law, Indiana University, Maurer School of Law, Distinguished 
Scholar in Intellectual Property Law and University Fellow.
1 See generally Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial 
Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1986) 
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intellectual property.2 For the most part, IP scholars in the academy 
overwhelmingly take the position that we have improperly extended 
intellectual property rights to the detriment of the public domain and, as such,
have almost uniformly expressed a disdain for the right of publicity. Professor 
Halpern was not of this opinion, however, finding a solid basis for this 
relatively new right. I found it refreshing that Halpern took a position contrary 
to so many of his colleagues in presenting a cogent argument in favor of the 
right of publicity. I have chosen this topic as a basis for my remembrance 
because it illustrates the way in which Halpern approached his chosen subject 
matter.
Before discussing Halpern’s justification of publicity rights, I would like 
to present a brief overview of the right. 
II. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY REVISITED
The “right of publicity” appeared for the first time in 1953 in Haelan 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.3 Judge Frank explained its 
basis as an economic rather than personal right:
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy . . . , a
man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph . . . [and] to grant the 
exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may 
validly be made “in gross” . . . .
This right might be called a “right of publicity.”4
The right of publicity quickly became a “formalized property right,”
distinct from the right of privacy, that enjoys “all the attributes of property,”
which includes transferability of the right.5 In the years after Haelan, the right 
of publicity has “taken hold” in a spectacular manner and is now established
by statute or common law in most states.6 In its various state-law iterations,
the right of publicity has taken shape into an almost boundless, descendible, 
and assignable property right.7 The problem is that the subject matter of the 
right and its transferability differs appreciably between states.8 Periodically,
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the notion of a harmonized federal law of the right has been debated, but so 
far, no unifying federal statue has emerged.9
Since its advent in U.S. law in 1953, the contours of the right of publicity 
have grown to embrace not only name and likeness, but also anything roughly 
relating to identity.10
These new identifiers comprise of objects associated with the celebrity’s
fame such as a racecar driver’s car,11 a football player’s nickname 
(Crazylegs),12 a catch phrase identified with a talk show host (Here’s
Johnny),13 a distinctive voice (Bette Midler),14 the likeness of a television 
personality (Vanna White),15 and a pitcher’s stance (Don Newcombe)16 to list 
a few examples.17
But why extend the right of publicity to encompass such tenuous attributes 
of identity such as nicknames, objects, and catchphrases? The search for a 
rationale for a right to publicity runs the gamut from natural law to various 
instrumentalist, incentive-based justifications.18 In my view, these attempts to 
validate the right of publicity are largely unpersuasive, whether based on 
Lockean labor theory and various concepts of human dignity or more 
instrumentalist justifications, like those supporting copyright or patent law to 
encourage the investment in the development of persona or to properly 
allocate scarce resources.19
III. SHELDON HALPERN AND ASSOCIATIVE VALUE OF PERSONALITY
Unlike some of his colleagues in academia, Halpern never took a reflex 
reaction against a robust regime of intellectual property rights. As for the right 
of publicity, a body of law disdained by his contemporaries, he took a 
characteristically pragmatic justification for this right, which he termed the 
“associative value of personality.”20 His concept of associative value, which 
he argues is the essential basis for the right of publicity, relates to the realities 
of the marketplace and the role that celebrities play in selling goods or 
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18 See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 35–40 (1997) (discussing 
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19 See generally Leaffer, supra note 5.
20 See generally Halpern, Publicity, supra note 1; Halpern, Associative Value, supra
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services.21 When a company desires to promote a product, it will often turn to 
the use of celebrities, paying substantially for the privilege. Thus, the sale of 
an individual’s persona to promote commercial products has developed into
“big business.”22 The right of publicity gives legal recognition to the value that 
celebrities provide to the promotion of goods and services. As Halpern put it: 
The phenomenon of celebrity generates commercial value. A celebrity’s
persona confers an associative value—an economic impact—upon the 
marketability of a product. As the Third Circuit . . . observed, “[a] famous 
individual’s name, likeness, and endorsement carry value and an 
unauthorized use harms the person both by diluting the value of the name and 
depriving that individual of compensation.” Whatever the social merit of 
commercialization of personality or the morality of commercializing one’s
identity, the economic reality persists.23
Halpern discounted the critics of the right who questioned its moral or 
economic soundness, and whether the right encourages individual creativity.
To him, all this was beside the point:
At bottom lies unhappiness with the reality of celebrity value, the 
“commodification” of personality. For many, a certain moral repugnance 
attaches to the commercialization of fame. As a purely personal matter, I 
suppose I would be happier intellectually in a society that did not endow fame 
with an economic value apart from the activity that creates the notoriety. But 
my personal aversion to market reality does not change that reality nor should 
it serve as a basis for devaluing a legal construct that recognizes that reality.24
In effect, whatever its conceptual underpinnings, the reality of associative 
value is an unavoidable and omnipresent fact of our commercial lives. 
Thus, when the courts deal with the right of publicity, they do not create the 
value; rather, as a matter of policy, the courts determine the extent to which 
one must compensate the person who has generated the economic value for 
use of the persona and the limits of the celebrity’s control over the 
exploitation of his or her personality.25
Halpern also took a realistic position concerning the extension of the right 
of publicity beyond mere name or likeness. In his view, it should not be 
important how a defendant appropriates the plaintiff’s identity, but whether the 
defendant actually did so.26 He would point to Motschenbacher, Carson, and
                                                                                                                     
21 See Halpern, Associative Value, supra note 1, at 856–69.
22 Id. at 856.
23 Id. at 857 (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting McFarland v. 
Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1994)).
24 Id. at 870–71 (footnote omitted). 
25 Id. at 858.
26 Id. at 860–63.
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Midler, cases that demonstrate the impracticality of extending the right of
publicity to a bright-line list enumerating the specific means of appropriating 
identity.27 After all, for some people, other indicia of persona may encompass 
traits, characteristics, mannerisms, or even paraphernalia unique to that 
person.28 Thus, a rule that would limit the right of publicity to specific 
methods of appropriation, such as name or likeness, would undermine, even 
eviscerate, the associative value of personality. Of course, Halpern was not 
arguing that all identifiers used by third parties should constitute actionable 
appropriation. Those identifiers that merit protection must unambiguously 
identify the person so that their use would enable “the defendant to appropriate 
the commercial value of the person’s identity.”29
Halpern made the point that the associative value basis for the right of 
publicity applies only to cases of commercial exploitation. Thus, the right of 
publicity does not ordinarily encompass “the use of a person’s identity in news 
reporting, commentary, entertainment, or in [sic] works of fiction or nonfiction 
or in advertising that is incidental to such uses.”30 The “newsworthy, 
entertainment, critical, satirical, or parodic uses” are privileged because they 
go past the unadorned act of appropriation.31
IV. CONCLUSION 
In revisiting Halpern’s 1995 article, I am particularly impressed by his 
common sense, pragmatic approach to the right of publicity. This was his 
attitude about the many other legal issues in our chosen field. Sometimes I 
disagreed with Halpern on certain issues, and he was persistent in trying to 
convince me that I was wrong. I will miss those exchanges. In my discussions 
with Halpern through the years, I have taken a less than enthusiastic view 
concerning the right of publicity. In my view, the right of publicity was born 
out of expediency, and has evolved in an explosive if not haphazard manner, 
leaving it to the courts and commentators to provide a sound justification for 
the right. The literature is voluminous, and I have yet to encounter totally 
persuasive justification for this all-inclusive right for the misappropriation of 
persona. On review of the literature, I am more convinced than ever that 
whatever interests the publicity right serves, trademark law, unfair competition 
law, and the growing law of false endorsement under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act can satisfy those interests.32 Despite my somewhat jaundiced 
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30 Id. at 868 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47).
31 Cher v. Forum Int’l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Rogers v. 
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1005 (2d Cir. 1989); Halpern, Associative Value, supra note 1, at 
868.
32 See generally Leaffer, supra note 5.
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view about the right of publicity, I believe that Halpern’s rationale for this 
controversial right is based on a sound ethical principal. Simply put, one who 
has created celebrity value should be the one to benefit from it, rather than a 
free rider who uses it and dissipates its value to obtain a commercial 
advantage. 
